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Abstract 
 
One of the fundamental goals of European integration is to provide less-developed 
member states opportunities for convergence and strengthen economic and social cohesion. 
Before the crisis the convergence process was impressive in the new member states. This 
success raises the question of how the institutions of the new EU member states match the 
institution types previously worked out for the old member states, and whether they resemble 
any of the broadly accepted four models of capitalism (Anglo-Saxon, Nordic, Continental 
European and Mediterranean) or represent a new type of model. Empirical analysis suggests 
that an independent Central and Eastern European model is eligible for existence. The 
characteristics of the model may be derived from three main factors: the lack of capital, weak 
civil society and the impact of the European Union and other international organisations 
influencing the new member states. 
FDI inflow could help to reduce the lack of capital. The success of convergence can be 
explained through the reconfiguration of the value chain after the collapse of communism by 
companies located in Continental and Northern Europe. These companies located their 
assembly activities in Central and Eastern Europe, and these countries could integrate not 
only within the EU but also within the world economy through increased investment and 
productivity. Although this convergence model has its limits, it provided sufficient space for 
the Central and Eastern European countries to develop, due to their low initial GDP levels. 
During the crisis the convergence has slowed down. The forthcoming period makes 
some changes in the convergence model necessary. The reduction in the private sector 
savings-investment gap is unavoidable. Savings must be used more efficiently than in the 
past. These suggestions are known in literature. However, two other important factors should 
also be taken into consideration. Failing to bridge the current productivity gap between 
foreign and domestic companies makes catching-up impossible. Population ageing and 
increased net migration from the Central and Eastern European countries has reached the level 
which demolishes their economic potential and destabilizes their societies in the medium and 
long run. These issues mean severe challenges on both national and European level. 
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Prior to the 2008 global crisis, the convergence process in the Central and Eastern 
European member states of the European Union was impressive. In the fifth year of the crisis, 
it seems increasingly obvious that these countries cannot follow the same development 
trajectory as they had prior to the crisis. Based on my previous empirical research, I first 
outline the Central and Eastern European model of capitalism, which had permitted their rapid 
catching up with the old member states (OMS) until 2008. In the second section, I investigate 
the limits of this model with respect to long run convergence. In the next sections, I review 
how the crisis has affected convergence performance and assess future prospects based on the 
evolution of the crisis to date. Finally, I summarise the types of policy changes that are 
necessary to maintain convergence performance. 
 
1. The Central and Eastern European model of capitalism 
 
One of the fundamental goals of European integration is to provide less-developed 
member states opportunities for convergence and strengthen economic and social cohesion. 
After the contraction period following the Central and Eastern European countries’ transition 
to market economies, their convergence performance in terms of GDP per capita at 
purchasing power parity was substantial prior to the global crisis. In 1995, the contraction 
resulting from the economic transition came to an end in the post-socialist countries. Using 
this year as a baseline for comparison, all of the Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEEC) were catching up with the EU-27 average, although to different degrees. The Baltic 
States, Slovakia and Poland achieved the greatest successes. However, growth in GDP per 
capita does not express the growth in a population’s welfare, which is a key goal of 
convergence. Therefore, it seems appropriate to measure convergence by also employing 
another indicator, i.e., actual individual final consumption.2 Finally, comparing each country’s 
economic performance to its own initial position, each of the CEEC made significant progress 
(Table 1).3 
This success raises the question of what type of institutional system made this success 
possible and how the institutions of the new EU member states match institutional types 
previously worked out for the OMS and whether they resemble any of the broadly accepted 
four models of capitalism (Anglo-Saxon, Nordic, Continental European and Mediterranean) 
or represent a new type of model.  
In the 1990s, the national differences experienced among EU member states attracted 
increasing attention. In this study, I note only three frequently cited works on this topic. 
Ebbinghaus (1999), Boeri (2002) and Sapir (2006) empirically described and verified 
existence of the Anglo-Saxon, Nordic, Continental and Mediterranean models. These 
institutional investigations are related to the literature on the varieties of capitalism (VoC). 
Globalisation and the fall of the Soviet empire have made it timely to question whether 
countries are heading for a single model of capitalism as a result of international competition. 
Both comparative economics and sociology are interested in the different institutional 
arrangements of capitalism. However, these studies have ignored the CEEC. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Actual individual final consumption includes: expenditures on the consumption of goods and services by both 
households and non-profit institutions serving households and in-kind social transfers. 
3
 The quality of statistical data was limited in the former socialist countries. Thus, the last comparison in Table 1, 
i.e., GDP per capita with 1989 serving as the base year, should be interpreted with caution. 
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Table 1. The catching up of the CEEC in per capita GDP in purchasing power standards (PPS) 
and in per capita actual individual final consumption with the EU-27 average and their 
economic performance in GDP per capita (in PPS) relative to 1989 levels 
 
Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Czech 
Rep. 
Slovakia Hungary Slovenia Romania  Bulgaria 
GDP per capita, EU-27=100 
1995 36 31 35 43 77 47 51 74 33 32 
2007 70 56 59 54 83 68 62 88 42 40 
Final consumption per capita, EU-27=100 
1995 36 34 38 44 68 38 49 75 35 35 
2007 64 56 63 55 69 63 59 80 45 44 
GDP per capita, 1989=100 
2007 150 124 116 169 139 154 135 151 120 107 
Note: actual individual final consumption (including expenditures on the consumption of goods and services by 
households and non-profit institutions serving households and in-kind social transfers. 
Sources: AMECO database; Eurostat database; EBRD (2008) p. 13 
 
 
More than twenty years have passed since the systemic change in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Ten countries from this region have become part of the European Union. It has only 
been between six to nine years since their accession, but their economic incorporation began 
soon after the changes in their political regimes. It can be assumed that stable social and 
economic frameworks have developed that are suitable for analysis. Recently, there have been 
several attempts to compare the CEEC with existing models, but these comparisons either 
include only a few countries or use a more limited list of features and data than the VoC 
literature does when analysing older capitalist states (Estrin et al. 2007, Hancké et al. 2007, 
Lane and Myant 2007). These studies compare the CEEC (or one group of them) with the 
Mediterranean countries or the Continental states, or even with coordinated market 
economies. Other works identify the features of the Anglo-Saxon or Liberal model in some 
countries (e.g., Cernat 2006, Buchen 2007, Feldmann 2007, King 2007, Knell and Srholec 
2007, Lane 2007, Mykhnenko 2007, Blanke and Hoffmann 2008, Csaba 2009). Nölke and 
Vliegenthart (2009) suggest a new dependent market economy model but limit it to the 
Visegrád countries. Bohle and Greskovits (2012) distinguish three groups within the CEEC, 
the neoliberal Baltic States, the embedded neoliberal Visegrád states and Slovenian 
neocorporatism. Beginning in the late 1990s, Bulgaria and Romania have also advanced 
towards the neoliberal pattern of economic and welfare state policy.   
None of the abovementioned studies conducted a detailed empirical analysis to 
compare the institutional arrangements of the OMS and the CEEC. Therefore, in my previous 
research, I examined six socio-economic sectors: product markets, labour markets, financial 
systems, social protection systems, education and R&D and innovation, using 112 indicators 
(Farkas 2011). I constructed a database using data from Eurostat, the European Central Bank, 
the World Bank, the Fraser Institute and UNCTAD. Unfortunately, two new member states, 
Cyprus and Malta, had to be omitted because several data points were missing. During data 
selection I only included hard data, meaning measurable data were preferred to indices based 
on the opinions of economic actors. To smooth fluctuations, most of the indicators are 
reported as the average values over the last three years. In this manner, I presented a snapshot 
of the first decade of the new millennium prior to the crisis.  
The main goal of the investigation was to classify the target countries within the given 
sub-systems and depict this classification using two-dimensional figures. The basic 
methodologies used to achieve this were cluster analysis and multidimensional scaling. The 
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cluster analysis provided reasonable results despite the small number of elements. The 
clusters for each sub-system were jointly examined in a way that made it possible to observe 
what new clusters would form if all the sub-systems were taken into account. As these new 
clusters were created from existing clustering categories, a so-called two-step cluster analysis 
was conducted using SPSS software. The advantage of this method is that it can handle 
categorical variables when forming the clusters. The classification of the member states 
produced by this analysis is nearly identical to that using the old models of capitalism 
reported in the literature, apart from the missing Anglo-Saxon model (Table 2). In this paper, 
I focus on the CEEC and therefore do not have space here to explain the smaller differences 
concerning the classification of the OMS. According to my research, the old models need to 
be supplemented with the Central and Eastern European model.  
 
Table 2. Clusters of EU-25 
 
North-western Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,  
Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, United Kingdom 
Mediterranean  Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain 
Nordic Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden 
Central and 
Eastern 
European 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
       Source: Farkas (2011) p. 29 
 
The cluster analysis indicated that the differences between the CEEC and OMS were 
more significant than the differences within the CEEC groups. Only Slovenia was a 
borderline case, and it seems to have moved from the CEEC group to the Continental group 
prior to the crisis. Table 3 summarises the similarities with previously existing models and 
shows that the individual sub-systems could not be classified within the existing models. 
If we examine the elements of the Central and Eastern European model thoroughly, we 
find that these can be traced back to three main aspects: a lack of capital, weak civil society 
and the effect of the EU and other international organisations that influenced the CEEC. 
The lack of capital made foreign capital investment necessary. However, as this 
investment occurred in parallel with prompt liberalisation, protectionism was not an option, as 
has been the case in emerging economies at other times or in other regions, owing to the 
economic paradigms dominant in the Western countries and the level of European integration 
achieved by the OMS. The lack of capital also made the creation of bank-based financial 
systems inevitable, as a substantial share of foreign capital inflows went into the financial 
sector, into banks. 
The operation of labour markets and industrial relations in the CEEC differs from that 
in both the Anglo-Saxon and the Mediterranean countries, as civil society is weaker and trade 
union density is lower. Absent the legal harmonisation within the EU, the position of 
employees would be even weaker. High or low levels of social protection and welfare 
distribution in the CEEC are highly correlated with relatively weak or strong civil society or 
traditions of social protection institutions. 
The system of R&D and innovation can be properly understood by considering certain 
background information: the domestic-based, internationally competitive business sector that 
is the driving force of innovation systems in the Nordic and Continental countries is missing. 
State-induced R&D cannot fill this gap. 
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Table 3. The Central and Eastern European model compared to the most similar models of the 
OMS 
 
Institutional 
area 
Most similar model of the OMS 
Product 
markets 
Situated in between the Continental and Mediterranean models. The 
product markets in the former are less flexible, while those in the 
second model are more flexible. Foreign investment explains the 
high technical development level in the CEEC. 
R&D and 
innovation 
Mediterranean model: low R&D expenditures with limited 
involvement by the business sector. Export and employment levels 
are below the EU average in the high-technology sector 
  
Financial 
system 
Bank-based Continental model (the financial systems of the 
Mediterranean countries can be described by the Continental model 
in this area) but at a significantly lower level of development. 
Labour 
market and 
industrial 
relations 
The labour market does not have that dual character typical of the 
Mediterranean and Continental models (insiders do not have a 
stronger position in the labour market relative to outsiders). This 
feature makes it similar to the Anglo-Saxon model, but the labour 
market in the Central and Eastern European model is less flexible. 
The similarities in industrial relations are also ambivalent. As in the 
Mediterranean model, the state interferes in industrial relations, but 
the relationship between employers and employees in collective 
bargaining is nearly free of conflict. Only Slovenia could be 
classified in the group of Continental countries. 
Social 
protection 
Three countries (Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) belong to the 
Continental model. The others are closer to the Anglo-Saxon model, 
but as in the case of the structure of the financial system, the 
traditions of Continental social security remain. 
Education  
There are no clear models in the area of education as were observed 
in other sub-systems. However, the CEEC exhibit similarities with 
Continental education systems. Slovenia was the only one to fall 
into the group of – mainly Nordic – countries with the most 
successful education systems. 
          Source: Farkas (2011) p. 29  
 
If the development of the Central and Eastern European model was not accidental but 
a response to prior conditions, then there is no reason to assume that this is only a temporary 
situation that will develop towards one of the European models of capitalism, rather than a set 
of institutions that can continuously reproduce itself. 
 
2. Results and limits of the Central and Eastern European model  
 
As Table 1 indicates, the Central and Eastern European model of capitalism enabled 
the post-socialist countries to converge towards the economic performance of the OMS. These 
developments have been investigated by experts from both the EU Commission and the 
World Bank. One of the analyses is the report on the “Five years of an enlarged EU” that 
resulted from the collaboration of several EU Commission services, and it exclusively 
analyses the new member states (European Commission 2009b). The other work is a book by 
the World Bank’s experts, entitled “Golden Growth. Restoring the Lustre of the European 
Economic Model” (Gill and Raiser 2012), which scrutinises the entire European Union. It is 
remarkable that both follow the same logic in assessing European convergence. Gill and 
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Raiser (2012) contrast the economic achievements of the CEEC and the Mediterranean 
countries; they interpret the convergence of the former group of countries as a success and the 
Mediterranean countries’ performances as, by and large, a failure. Both analyses regard trade 
openness, FDI inflows and institutional improvements resulting from EU accession as the key 
drivers of growth. The EU report estimates that “each year during the period 2000–2008 
accession gave the new member states an extra growth boost of approximately 1¾ per cent on 
average… Model simulations suggest that…the new member states enjoy 50–100 basis points 
advantage relative to other emerging countries with comparable fundamentals” (European 
Commission 2009b, 17). 
Both analyses agree that foreign capital inflows made it possible to overcome the lack 
of savings in the CEEC. Gill and Raiser (2012) emphasise that Europe is the only region 
where capital flows in the “right” direction, that is, towards poorer, high-growth countries. 
Both the experts of the EU and the World Bank explain the success of convergence through 
the reconfiguration of the value chains of companies located in Continental and Northern 
Europe following the collapse of communism. These companies located their assembly 
facilities in Central and Eastern Europe, and due to lower wages they could strengthen their 
competitiveness through flexibility in offshoring. Increased investment and productivity 
allowed Central and Eastern Europe to not only integrate with the EU but also with the world 
economy as a whole.4  
However, while additional aspects of the European convergence process should be 
considered, no previous analysis does this. In economic theory, FDI can enhance productivity 
growth directly (through investment) and indirectly (through spill-over effects). Both channels 
operate in the CEEC, but experiences over the last two decades suggest that FDI-based 
modernisation has its limits. Neither the World Bank experts (Gill and Raiser 2012) nor the 
EU report (European Commission 2009b) raise the question prompted by the division of 
labour and production between the north-western countries and the CEEC outlined above. 
How does this FDI-based convergence model ensure long run convergence? Although there is 
the potential for upgrading along the value chain, there is no reason to assume that foreign 
companies will abandon their key positions in innovation, technology development and 
strategic decision-making.5 It seems much more likely that the current division of labour and 
production will essentially be reproduced.  
Another possibility to increase growth potential through FDI is that spill-over effects 
would encourage domestic companies to foster internationally competitive economies that are 
able to accelerate and complete the catching up process. The single market concept presumes 
that competition will force productivity improvements in every part of the economy. The 
literature on FDI spill-overs suggests unambiguous positive productivity effects in the case of 
vertical, backward linkages. Domestic firms occupy the dependent position in these 
relationships. The horizontal spill-over effects seem to be weak in the overwhelming majority 
                                                 
4
 In the CEEC, the main form of foreign capital was FDI, while the Mediterranean countries attracted portfolio 
investment and other capital inflows. According to Gill and Raiser (2012), the reason for the difficult situation in 
Southern Europe is that these countries did not participate in the reconfiguration of value chains that began in the 
late 1990s and have few global companies. However, the Central European countries were the primary 
beneficiaries of rapid technology transfers, where the FDI flowed into manufacturing, which is a tradable sector. 
(Slovenia is a special case where FDI stocks remained low.) In the Baltic States, Bulgaria and Romania, FDI was 
biased in favour of banking, real estate and other non-tradable sectors (Becker et al. 2010, European Commission 
2010a).         
5
 The European Competitiveness Report notes: “Despite high levels of internalisation in the EU-12, the bulk of 
foreign-owned R&D and innovation activity takes place between EU-15 member states” (European Commission, 
2010b).   
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of empirical investigations (Gorodnichenko et al. 2007, Hanousek et al. 2010).6 The third 
means of economic development would be to strengthen domestic capital accumulation. 
However, the CEEC have high levels of FDI inflows coupled with low savings rates. 
Therefore, domestic investment has not been a decisive factor in this model, in contrast to 
some Asian countries. 
Irish economic development is also instructive with respect to the FDI-based 
modernisation. A state agency, the Industrial Development Authority, was very successful at 
identifying emerging sectors and attracting multinational companies in those sectors to 
Ireland. Since the Culliton Report was published in 1992, the Irish government has striven to 
adopt a “holistic approach” to industrial development and policy. This means that the 
government attempted to eliminate the serious dichotomy that existed between domestic and 
foreign-owned firms. Irish economic development policy achieved numerous successes; many 
domestic SMEs grew out of foreign-owned firms through linkages and spill-overs, mainly in 
the software industry (Andreosso-O’Callaghan – Lenihan 2006, Barry – Bergin 2012). 
Despite these results, labour productivity remained higher in foreign-owned enterprises in 
every manufacturing industry in 2006. In Ireland, foreign firms remain highly concentrated in 
large and high-tech manufacturing activities after a twenty-year catching up process. This 
need not be the case in a small, open economy. In Sweden, foreign firms are more evenly 
distributed across manufacturing and services, and domestic firms control the highly export-
oriented and technology-based engineering sector (Andreosso-O’Callaghan – Lenihan 2010).         
I was unable to locate complete data on the differences in productivity between 
foreign-owned and domestic firms in EU member states. However, the foreign-owned 
enterprises typically belong to large companies, not only in Ireland but also in the CEEC. I 
can therefore exploit the difference in labour productivity between large companies and SMEs 
as a rough proxy for the difference in productivity between foreign-owned and domestic 
firms. The empirical data suggest that there have been much larger differences between 
foreign-owned/large firms and domestic enterprises/SMEs over several decades in the 
majority of the CEEC and Mediterranean countries than in non-Mediterranean OMS. Figure 1 
shows that difference between large firms and SMEs is small in five new member states: 
Estonia, Malta, Slovenia, Latvia and Slovakia. In the case of Estonia, Latvia, and Malta, the 
large companies’ contribution to GDP is far below the EU average, and the bulk of FDI went 
rather to the non-tradable service sector.7 Slovenia and Slovakia are the only CEEC where 
large companies and manufacturing make substantial contributions to GDP, and the difference 
in productivity between the large firms and SMEs is comparable to that in north-western EU 
member states. In the other CEEC and Mediterranean countries, the difference is far larger 
than 40 percentage points. In most cases, the productivity of medium enterprises exhibits a 
similar trend, but the degree of difference is smaller.8 Nevertheless, abundant foreign capital 
inflows – in the form of FDI in Ireland and the post-socialist countries and portfolio and other 
investments in the Mediterranean countries – obscured this problem prior to the 2008 crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Both studies provide a comprehensive overview of the literature concerning spill-over effects in emerging 
Europe.  
7
 In Estonia and Latvia, FDI thereby fuelled an unsustainable boom and contributed to the development of 
housing bubbles. 
8
 I chose the last year before the crisis to avoid temporary distortion effects. 
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Figure 1. Difference in labour productivity between large enterprises and SMEs and medium 
enterprises in percentage points, 2007 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Wymenga et al. (2011) 
Note: labour productivity is measured by gross value added per employed person 
 
Due to the low initial GDP levels in the CEEC, the above-outlined limitations of the 
Central and Eastern European model could be disregarded; it provided sufficient space for 
these countries to develop. If the crisis had not occurred, the poorer countries could have 
developed further within the framework of the European convergence model; although 
development would have been concentrated in the areas that had attracted foreign capital 
(typically the capitals and their agglomerations), prompting increasing regional inequalities. 
However, it is remarkable that the Czech Republic, which had one of the highest initial GDP 
levels in Central and Eastern Europe and followed highly disciplined economic (fiscal) policy, 
has made very moderate progress in catching up. Slovenia, with its higher initial GDP level, 
has achieved greater convergence but has consistently employed different means, focusing on 
the domestic economy, and had already accumulated imbalances prior to the crisis (Table 1). 
In sum, it is questionable whether the Central and Eastern European model is appropriate for 
the long run catching up of those countries that are already close to the efficiency/technical 
frontier (Farkas 2013). 
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3. The CEEC in the crisis 
 
The previously advantageous FDI-based modernisation caused the CEEC to be 
particularly vulnerable during the crisis when capital inflows fell. In 2009, the rate of decline 
exceeded the EU average in every new member state, except for Poland. The Baltic 
economies contracted to the largest extent, i.e., by 14-17 per cent in 2009. 
Scrutinising these countries, it becomes apparent that the severity of the recession 
unambiguously depended on the degree of pre-crisis economic imbalances. Three Central 
European countries, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, did not accumulate notable 
imbalances prior to the crisis. In the Central European countries (including Hungary and 
Slovenia), growth was accompanied by small and improving trade imbalances, as a reflection 
of reindustrialisation after the economic transition that followed the fall of the socialist 
system. These five countries had little or no problems with respect to their competitiveness in 
their tradable sectors. Despite the favourable conditions in manufacturing, in Hungary, the 
initial levels of both private and public debt were high at the beginning of the crisis; the 
Slovenian economy was overheated (characterised by full capacity utilisation and inflation 
pressure) when the crisis broke out, and the private sector (mainly corporate) debt position 
increased. In the three Baltic States, Bulgaria, and Romania, growth in the period preceding 
the crisis was driven by domestic demand, whereas the contribution of net exports to growth 
was negative. In this second group, the current account balance deteriorated sharply, and these 
countries were on an unsustainable development path, even before the crisis. The underlying 
issue is that these economies suffer from competitiveness issues in their tradable sectors 
(Farkas 2012).  
The Baltic States achieved a very rapid, successful adjustment, but it is expected that 
Estonia and Lithuania will reach pre-crisis GDP levels in 2014 and Latvia even later. By 
2011, with the exceptions of Hungary and Slovenia, the growth rate in the CEEC once again 
climbed above the EU average. This trend seems to be continuing into the current year. 
Additionally, since 2012, the Czech economy has also experienced a weak recovery (Figure 
2).   
 
Figure 2. Changes in GDP at constant prices between 2008-2014 (2007=100 per cent) 
 
 
Note: 2013, 2014: forecast 
Source: AMECO database 
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The GDP growth rates are reflected in the convergence of per capita GDP in PPS. 
Currently, it seems that the majority of the CEEC will continue to converge with the EU-27, 
but at a slower rate. Convergence in Hungary and the Czech Republic has come to a halt, and 
the convergence performance of the poorest countries, Romania and Bulgaria, has been 
meagre since the crisis. Moreover, Slovenia (as in the case of the Mediterranean countries) is 
diverging from the EU-27 average (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Changes in per capita GDP in PPS in the CEEC compared to the EU-27 average 
between 2008-2014 (EU-27=100) 
 
 
Note: 2013, 2014: forecast 
Source: AMECO database 
 
 
4. Long term projections 
 
To evaluate the implications of the reduced rate of convergence mentioned in the 
previous section, we need long term projections of these countries convergence prospects. 
Beyond cyclical changes, the potential growth rate indicates whether convergence is 
sustainable. The EU Commission prepares long term projections to monitor the anticipated 
economic effects of ageing populations. The intermediate results from these investigations are 
also instructive for our purposes, i.e., to evaluate the gravity of slowing convergence. The 
Commission’s investigations employ a production function relying on the neoclassical growth 
model. In this model, potential GDP can be formally expressed as total output, represented by 
a combination of factor inputs (labour and capital) multiplied by total factor productivity, 
which reflects technological capacity. It should be stressed these long term projections suffer 
from an extremely high degree of uncertainty. As a result, the Commission’s projections 
cannot account for future institutional and policy changes; they can only transpose current 
conditions into the future and thereby assess the probability of certain future developments. 
However, they provide meaningful information on probable trends if fundamental conditions 
remain unchanged. 
The Commission’s 2009 Ageing Report reveals that as a result of the decline in 
population, even without incorporating the potentially negative impacts of the current 
economic crisis, the annual average potential GDP growth rate in the EU is likely to fall from 
2.4 per cent in the period 2007-2020, to 1.7 per cent in the period 2021-2040, and then to 1.3 
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per cent in the period 2041-2060. This is why labour productivity remains paramount; over 
time, it is the only driver of growth. The deterioration in the growth rates of the post-socialist 
EU member states will be greater because of their more severe, than in the EU-15, rate of 
population decline (European Commission 2009a). From 2000 to 2011, approximately half of 
the population decline in the post-socialist member states was due to net migration and the 
other half to natural decline (Gligorov et al. 2012).  
The most striking pattern in the population decline across the EU is that the decrease 
in the 0-14 age group is most prominent in the CEEC. Figure 4 presents the EU member states 
where the number of young people (aged 0-14) has diminished since 2000. Accordingly, 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic are the only post-socialist countries where the decrease is 
less than 10 per cent in this age group. 
 
Figure 4. Population decline in youth population: aged 0-14, 2000-2011 in per cent 
 
 
Source: AMECO database 
 
The 2012 Ageing Report was published at the end of 2011 and re-evaluated the 
potential growth rates of the EU and the member states using a production function based 
methodology, as in previous reports.9 Table 4 compares the projections of the Ageing Reports 
from 2012 and 2009. As expected, the data concerning countries most severely affected by the 
global financial crisis required the greatest adjustments.10 Demographic factors also played a 
role in longer term negative adjustments. However, the primary reason for the adjustments 
                                                 
9
 In the 2012 Ageing Report, a key assumption for the long term projection concerns the rate of productivity 
growth; all countries should converge to the same total factor productivity growth rate (1 per cent) by the end of 
the projection period in 2060 (European Commission 2011). 
10
 The adjustment is the largest in the cases of Cyprus, Romania, Greece, Portugal and Hungary. However, for 
Greece and Portugal, the potential GDP projections did not incorporate the impact of the measures required in 
the economic agreements made with the EU, IMF and ECB. 
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was the expected decline in the rate of productivity growth. The lower growth rate also 
substantially reduced the long run development prospects of per capita GDP. It is remarkable 
that the 2012 Ageing Report abandons the assumption of absolute convergence in 
productivity and GDP levels across countries. This is because the growth rate that would be 
required to permit this convergence in its projections would not be plausible in the short and 
medium term (European Commission 2011). 
 
Table 4. Potential growth rate and level of per capita GDP development in the CEEC in the long 
run  
 
 
2010-2060 
 potential 
growth 
rate  
2012 
projection 
Adjustment 
of  2012 
projection 
compared 
to 2009 
projection 
GDP per capita in PPS 
in 2060  
based on 
2009 
projection  
based on 
2012 
projection  
EU-27 1,4 -0,2 100,0 100,0 
Bulgaria  1,3 -0,3 58,5 55,4 
Czech Rep. 1,5 0,0 92,8 88,0 
Estonia 1,5 -0,3 102,4 78,4 
Latvia 1,1 -0,3 78,7 65,5 
Lithuania  1,3 -0,2 83,3 71,7 
Hungary 1,2 -0,5 77,1 63,4 
Poland 1,5 0,0 66,4 75,9 
Romania  1,1 -0,7 61,5 39,5 
Slovenia  1,3 -0,1 94,3 89,9 
Slovakia  1,6 -0,1 93,6 83,4 
Sources: European Commission (2011) p. 31; development of the per capita GDP is calculated in Halmai, P. and 
Vásáry, V. (2012) p. 319  
 
 
In summary, the Ageing Reports employ a production function framework in the long 
term projection exercise to project long term GDP growth. In this framework, the drivers of 
growth include capital deepening, total factor productivity and total hours worked. Therefore, 
demographic projections are crucial for projecting economic development over the long term. 
The crisis reduced capital formation and total factor productivity growth, the impacts of 
which are amplified by the population decline. The lower potential growth rates limit the 
foreseeable convergence of the CEEC to the EU-27 GDP average, even when forecasting 
several decades ahead. Even if we consider the uncertainty of these projections, it is 
undisputable that to maintain convergence, substantial efforts at both the European and 
national levels will be required in the long run. 
 
 
5. Conclusions: required policy changes in the European convergence process 
 
As we have seen, convergence has slowed during the crisis. There is a danger that this 
is not a temporary phenomenon but the beginning of a medium-term or even longer trend. The 
contracted markets of the economies in the European Union do not promote export-led growth 
in the CEEC, and the management of the European debt crisis and stricter financial regulation 
decrease the capital available to these countries. FDI and cross-border production networks 
cannot play as dynamic a role in convergence as they did before the crisis. Financial markets’ 
risk evaluations may remain higher, even for those  countries that are not affected by more 
severe financial difficulties. Due to the indebtedness of households and governments in the 
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majority of the CEEC, the diminishing external resources and markets cannot substitute for 
domestic ones. Inequalities across EU member states induce emigration, which reduces the 
economic growth potential of the sending countries and accelerates the ageing of their 
populations. 
Gill and Raiser (2012) raise a question regarding the future of European convergence. 
They are very optimistic: “Restarting the convergence machine will not be difficult” (Gill and 
Raiser 2012, 10). The task is very simple; the project of establishing a single market for 
services should be completed. Although market liberalisation in services would be 
advantageous for the CEEC, it is difficult to imagine that it could compensate for the 
diminishing external and internal sources that I have outlined above. 
In their joint studies, experts at Bruegel, a European think tank, and the Vienna 
Institute for International Economic Studies, an independent research institute, made more 
sophisticated policy suggestions to reorient the European convergence model. Their starting 
point is that a reduction in the private sector savings-investment gap is unavoidable. In the 
medium-term, this will lead to the problem of dampened domestic demand. A sustained 
resurgence of growth requires a more efficient use of savings than in the past. They list a 
range of policies (human capital, technology, industrial and regional) that should be employed 
to improve the competitiveness of tradable sectors (Becker et al. 2010). 
In my opinion, there are further conclusions that must be drawn. Before 2008, it was 
thought that Ireland and the Mediterranean member states had reached (or at least closely 
approached) the EU-27 averages in both GDP and living standards. Therefore, the EU-15 was 
considered a well-integrated area. The crisis revealed that only the north-western EU 
countries had internationally competitive domestic companies. Ireland has a relatively good 
chance to restore its position due to its geographic location, small size and well-embedded 
market institutions. However, the Mediterranean countries have diverged from the EU-27 
GDP average for several years and are no longer considered core countries. Therefore, one of 
the most important lessons from the crisis for the CEEC is that they have to focus on domestic 
economic development.  
If foreign capital becomes scarcer, it will become all the more important in coming 
years to promote positive spill-over effects through economic policy. Although there are 
numerous studies on the channels through which spill-over effects and other local economic 
development measures operate, the problems of a dual economy and the development of an 
internationally competitive domestic economy are missing from EU policies (e.g., cohesion, 
innovation). Failing to bridge the productivity gap between foreign and domestic companies 
renders catching up impossible. The policy measures to develop a competitive domestic 
economy are essentially in the hands of national governments. The EU policy framework does 
not make it impossible to primarily foster domestic economic growth through the 
development of SMEs. Slovakia and Slovenia seem to be successful in this field. However, 
the efforts of Irish governments over the decades reveal how difficult is to achieve long 
lasting results. E.g., support for SMEs has consistently been on the agendas of Hungarian 
governments but without significant results. The EU’s cohesion policy can only have a 
significant impact if national economic policy creates the appropriate environment. In 
addition, the success of economic policy depends on not only the government but also on the 
state of social capital and other social and institutional conditions. 
Despite these difficulties, efforts must be made to maintain cohesion through the 
relevant policies because a certain degree of inequality leads to disintegration.11 European 
cohesion policy should directly address these problems. A general European SME support 
programme cannot replace a targeted approach. The competitiveness issues in the 
                                                 
11
 For information on weakening cohesion as a security challenge for the European Union, see Farkas 
(forthcoming). 
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Mediterranean countries indicate that the obstacles to the development of SMEs (e.g., weak 
enterprise knowledge, access to capital, rigidity of regulations, etc.) are substantial not only in 
the post-socialist countries but in all peripheral countries relative to the business environment 
in the old, non-Mediterranean countries. To exchange best practises, tailor-made actions in the 
framework of cohesion policy can support national economic policies. Successful SME 
development policy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the reduction of the 
productivity gap between foreign and domestic firms, which requires a comprehensive 
economic development policy (Farkas 2013).  
Even if the economic actors in a country, including the government, successfully adjust 
their behaviour and economic policies, we cannot assume a return to the speed of convergence 
prior to the crisis. The reorientation of the Central and Eastern European model – that is the 
augmentation of the FDI-based modernisation with more powerful domestic economic 
development – requires high-quality government activities to promote the competitiveness of 
the tradable sector. It is difficult to believe that all of the governments in the CEEC will be 
able to exhibit high levels of administrative performance. 
These consequences of the global crisis make certain changes in the concept of 
integration necessary. The degree and speed of convergence among countries has played a 
central role in assessments of the effectiveness and legitimacy of European integration in 
recent decades. If the necessary adjustments to the post-crisis reality are not realised at the 
conceptual level of European integration, the legitimacy of integration will be jeopardised. 
The Union’s raison d’être over the next decade will be tied to the fact that without integration, 
European countries will not be considered global economic players. If, however, the speed of 
convergence remains a measure of the success of integration, the EU will doom itself. 
Furthermore, whether the public will accept the realities of this new period is an important 
question because the expectation of rapid convergence was the most attractive element and 
the main legitimating factor of EU membership in the CEEC. Considering all of these aspects, 
we cannot count on an economically and socially homogeneous area in the foreseeable future 
as the current integration concept does. The maintenance of a multi-speed integration process 
will be the most important challenge for European integration. 
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